We address the following dynamic version of the school choice question: a city, named City, admits students in two temporally-separated rounds, denoted R 1 and R 2 . In round R 1 , the capacity of each school is fixed but in round R 2 , the City is happy to allocate extra seats to specific schools per the recommendation of the mechanism; in turn, the latter has to meet specified requirements. We study three natural settings of this model, with the requirements getting increasingly stringent. For Settings I and II, we give pairs of polynomial time mechanisms (M 1 , M 2 ) which, besides addressing the specific requirements, find stable matchings, are dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) w.r.t. reporting preference lists of students, and never break, in round R 2 , a match created in round R 1 .
Introduction
School choice is among the most consequential events in a child's upbringing, whether it is admission to elementary, middle or high school, and hence has been accorded its due importance not only in the education literature but also in game theory and economics. In order to deal with the flaws in the practices of the day, the seminal paper of Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [AS03] formulated this as a mechanism design problem. This approach has been enormously successful, especially in large cities involving the admission of hundreds of thousands of students into hundreds of schools, e.g., see [APR09, ACP + 17, AS13, Pat11] , and today occupies a key place in the area of market design in economics, e.g., see [RS12, Rot08, Rot16, ftToC19] .
Once the basic issues in school choice were adequately addressed, researchers turned attention to the next level of questions. In this vein, in a very recent paper, Feigenbaum et. al. [FKLS18] remarked, "However, most models considered in this literature are essentially static. Incorporating dynamic considerations in designing assignment mechanisms ... is an important aspect that has only recently started to be addressed." Our paper deals with precisely this. We study three natural settings in which students need to be assigned to schools in two temporally-separated rounds, denoted R 1 and R 2 , for which we give mechanisms M 1 and M 2 , respectively. M 1 finds a stable matching M in round R 1 . In round R 2 , additional students need to be assigned to the schools. We want that M 2 should also yield a stable matching, besides having other nice properties. Clearly, the task of M 2 would be a lot simpler if it were allowed to reassign the schools of a small number of students who were matched in round R 1 . However, one of our central tenets is to disallow this altogether. Indeed, switching the school of a student midway, unsynchronized with her classmates, is well-known to cause traumatic effects, e.g., see [GDE12] . Hence, M 2 must extend M to a stable matching M ′ .
The use of Gale-Shapley student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which finds a studentoptimal stable matching of students to schools, has emerged as a method of choice in the literature. Two main advantages of this method are:
1. As a consequence of stability, once the matching is done, no student and school, who are not matched to each other, will have the incentive to go outside the mechanism to strike a deal. Another advantage of stability is that it eliminates justified envy, i.e., the following situation cannot arise: there is a student s i who prefers another student s j 's school assignment while being fully aware that s j 's school preferred her to s j .
2. This mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), for students. This entails that regardless of the preferences reported by other students, a student can do no better than report her true preference list, i.e., truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all students. This immediately simplifies the task of students and their parents, since they don't need to waste any effort trying to game the system.
In all three settings, we give a pair of mechanisms (M 1 , M 2 ) which run in polynomial time and M 2 extends, in a stable manner, the stable matching found by M 1 . Additionally, for the first two settings, (M 1 , M 2 ) are DSIC for students w.r.t. reporting their preference lists. The additional requirements are much more stringent in Setting III due to which we were unable to find DSIC mechanisms; see the requirements below. Instead, we define the weaker notion of weak incentive compatible (WIC) mechanism, under which a student cannot gain by misreporting her choices, if all other students are truthful, and we provide such a pair of mechanisms.
The three settings involve the admission of students of a city, named City, into schools; the preference lists of both are provided to the mechanisms. In round R 1 , the capacity of each school is fixed but in round R 2 , the City is happy to allocate extra seats to specific schools per the recommendation of mechanism M 2 , which in turn has to meet specified requirements imposed by the City. In this round, in Settings I and II, M 1 finds a student-optimal stable matching M.
Let L be the set of left-over students, those who could not be admitted in this round.
In round R 2 of Setting I, the problem is to maximize the number of students admitted from L, by extending M in a stability-preserving, DSIC manner. In Setting II, a set N of new students also arrive from other cities and their preference lists are revealed to M 2 . The requirement now is to admit as few students as possible from N and subject to that, as many as possible from L, again in a stability-preserving, DSIC manner.
In Setting III, some students, who are residents of the City, try to game the system by not appearing in round R 1 but only showing up in round R 2 , thereby getting admission to a better school. Therefore, M 2 needs to be incentive compatible not only w.r.t. preference lists but also late arrival. We note that the previous mechanisms were all oblivious in that they needed to know only the preference lists of students being considered for admission and not those who were not participating. We first prove there is no pair of oblivious, stability-preserving, DISC mechanisms (M 1 , M 2 ) that ensure that students can't gain by deliberately not showing up in round R 1 . We then give a pair of non-oblivious mechanisms, that know the preference lists of all students who reside in the City. As stated previously, these are WIC, though not DSIC mechanisms.
Finally, we also give a procedure that outputs all possible stability-preserving extensions of a given stable matching (which may be exponentially many) with polynomial delay.
Related work
Besides the references pointed out above on school choice, in this section, we will concentrate on recent work on dynamic matching markets, especially those pertaining to school choice. Feigenbaum et. al. [FKLS18] study the following issue that arises in NYC public high schools, which admits over 80,000 students annually: after the initial centralized allocation, about 10% of the students choose not attend the school allocated to them, instead going to private or charter schools. To deal with this, [FKLS18] give a two-round solution which maintains truthfulness and efficiency and minimizes the movement of students between schools.
An interesting phenomena that has been observed in matching markets is unraveling, under which matches are made early to beat the competition, even though it leads to inefficiencies due to unavailability of full information. A classic case, indeed one that motivated the formation of centralized clearing houses, is that of the market for medical interns in which contracts for interns were signed two years before the future interns would even graduate [Rot84] . A theoretical explanation of this phenomena was recently provided by [EP16] .
We note that the phenomena we are studying in Setting III can be viewed as anti-unraveling: some students are able to game the system by making the match late. Clearly, this aspect deserves more work. We also note that this phenomenon is by no means rare, e.g., it occurred in the Pasadena School District and the authorities were made specific recommendations by economists from Caltech to counter it [Ech19] .
[KK18] point out that stable pairings may not necessarily last forever, e.g., a student may switch from private to public school or a married couple may divorce. They study dynamic, multiperiod, bilateral matching markets and they define and identify sufficient conditions for the existence of a dynamically stable matching.
Overview of structural and algorithmic ideas
The main idea for obtaining a stability-preserving mechanism in round R 2 for Settings I and II lies in the notion of a barrier which ensures that students admitted in R 2 do not form blocking pairs. At the same time, we need to place our barriers optimally to ensure that the number of students admitted is optimized (minimized or maximized) appropriately. The main idea in these settings for achieving DSIC mechanisms is to ensure that the best school that a student can be matched to is independent of her preference list. If so, her best outcome results from truthfully revealing her preference list.
Perhaps our most interesting result is the pair of mechanisms for Setting III. As already pointed out, no oblivious mechanism exists for this problem. The idea behind our non-oblivious mechanism M 1 is to prepare the round R 1 matching M in such a way that the defectors, i.e., residents of the City who opt not to participate in round R 1 , will not be able to get admission to a better school by arriving only in round R 2 . For this, M 1 needs to know the preference lists of not only students participating in round R 1 , but also the defectors, hence making it non-oblivious.
The algorithm for enumerating stable extensions of a stable matching, given in Section 5, relies heavily on the fundamental structural property of stable matchings given in Lemma 2. Enumerated matchings are extended by only one student in an iteration. At each step, the algorithm finds all such feasible extensions by one student in a way such that there must be at least one feasible assignment, for any student, at each step. This assurance is crucial in guaranteeing that the delay between any two enumerated matchings is polynomial.
Preliminaries

The stable matching problem for school choice
The stable matching problem takes as input a set H = {h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h m } of m public schools and a set S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n } of n students who are seeking admission to the schools. Each school h j ∈ H has an integer-valued capacity, c(j), stating the maximum number of students that can be assigned to it. If h j is assigned c(j) students, we will say that h j is filled, and otherwise it is under-filled. Most of the mechanisms presented in this paper are dominant-strategy incentive-compatibile, for the students, i.e., truth-telling is a weakly-dominant strategy for students: they cannot gain by being untruthful, regardless of what the others do. We will often shorten this term to DSIC mechanism.
Problem Definition and the Three Settings
As stated above, in this paper, we will study assignment of students to schools in two rounds, R 1 and R 2 , which are temporally separated. In this section we state the three settings studied; for each, we will have two mechanisms, M 1 and M 2 . In round R 1 , mechanism M 1 finds a stable matching of students to schools, M. In round R 2 , M 2 extends M to M ′ , which is also required to be stable; by extends we mean that additional student-school pairs are matched.
The students report their preference lists and the mechanisms operate on whatever is reported. We will assume that the schools' preference lists are truthfully reported and we will show that in each of the three settings, (M 1 , M 2 ) are DSIC for students, hence showing that the students gain nothing by misreporting their preference lists.
We now state the common aspects of the first two settings before describing them completely; the third setting is quite different. In both, in round R 1 , the setup defined in Section 2.1 prevails and M 1 simply computes the student-optimal stable matching denoted by M. Let S M ⊆ S be the set of students assigned to schools by M and L = S − S M be the set of left-over students. As shown in [DF81] , M 1 is DSIC for students.
As described above, in round R 1 , the capacity of each school is fixed: to c(j) for h j . In round R 2 , the City has decided to extend matching M in a stable, DSIC manner to matching M ′ and will appropriately add extra seats to schools. Let c ′ (j) be the round R 2 capacity of school h j , for h j ∈ H.
Once we obtain the solution under this assumption, we will show how it can be modified in case the City can only add a fewer number of extra seats.
Lemma 1. For some student s i , let M(s i ) = h j . Then for any student s k ∈ L, s k appears after s i in l(h j ).
Proof. If s k were to appear before s i in l(h j ), then (s k , h j ) will form a blocking pair for M, contradicting its stability.
Setting I
In this setting, the City wants to admit as many students from L as possible in a stablitypreserving, DSIC manner. We will call this problem Max L . We will prove the following: Let k be the maximum number of students that can be added from L, as per Theorem 1. Next, suppose that the City can only afford to add k ′ < k extra seats. We show in Section 4.1 how this can be achieved while maintaining all the properties stated in Theorem 1.
Setting II
In this setting, a set N of new students arrive from other cities in round R 2 . In Setting II, the mechanisms are assumed to be oblivious in the following sense: they do not know the set of actual residents of the City, only what is reported to them. Thus, a resident of the City s i may opt to not report her preference list in round R 1 and the mechanisms will assume that she is not in S. In round R 2 , s i may report her preference list, and if so, the mechanisms will assume she is in N (in Setting III, the mechanisms will be non-oblivious). The preference lists of schools are also updated to include students in N appropriately. In this setting, the City wants to give preference to students who were not matched in round R 1 , i.e., L, over the new students, N. We will call this problem Min N Max L . We will prove the following:
There is a polynomial time mechanism M 2 that is DSIC for students and accomplishes the following:
1. It finds smallest subset N ′ ⊆ N with which the current matching can be extended in a stabilitypreserving manner.
Subject to the previous extension, it finds the largest subset L ′ ⊆ L with which the current matching
can be extended further in a stability-preserving manner.
Setting III
In Theorem 5, we will prove that no pair of mechanisms can ensure that revealing preference lists in round R 1 is a dominant strategy for the residents of the City. For this reason, in Setting III, we turn to mechanisms that are non-oblivious, i.e., they know the entire set S of residents of the City and all residents are required to report their preference lists in round R 1 . In this framework, we give a pair of mechanisms achieving a weaker incentive-compatibility guarantee (Theorem 3). In round R 1 , a subset S 1 ⊆ S of students declare that they are seeking admission to public schools. Mechanism M 1 finds a student-optimal stable matching, M, on set S M ⊆ S 1 of students. Let L = S 1 − S M denote the set of left-over students.
In round R 2 , a subset of (S − S 1 ) of the residents of the City decide to seek admission to public schools. In addition, new students arrive from other cities as well and provide their preference lists over schools and the schools also update their preference lists to include the new students. Let N denote the set of all students who are seeking admission to public schools in round R 2 ; N includes new students as well as residents.
As before, the City will not alter the matching of any students matched in M and would like to maximize the number of students admitted from L, since they were left out in round R 1 and minimize the number of students matched from N; the extended matching, M ′ again needs to be stable.
Finally, we require that (M 1 , M 2 ) be incentive compatible for students in the following sense: a student cannot gain by misreporting his preference list, participating only in R 2 even though he is in S, or both, assuming all other students are truthful. We say that (M 1 , M 2 ) is weak incentive-compatible (WIC) if the above condition is satisfied. We establish the following: 
The Mechanisms
Setting I
We will first characterize situations under which a matching is not stable, i.e., admits a blocking pair. This characterization will be used for proving stability of matchings constructed in round R 2 . For this purpose, assume that M is an arbitrary matching, not necessarily stable nor related to the matching computed in round R 1 . For each school h j ∈ H, define the lowest preferred student assigned to h j , denoted LPS-Assigned(h j ), to be the student that h j prefers the least among the students that are assigned to h j . F The mechanism, M 2 , for round R 2 for Max L in Situation I is given in Figure 1 .
Step 1 simply ensures that the matching found by M 2 extends the round R 1 matching.
Step 2 defines the Barrier for each school to be BStP(h j ); observe that this could be ∅.
Step 3 computes the subset of L that needs to be assigned schools in a stability-preserving manner and Step 5 computes the school for each student in this subset.
Proof. of Theorem 1:
Suppose Barrier(h j ) = s i (or, ∅). Since all students assigned to h j from L appear before s i (respectively, ∅) in l(h j ), therefore by Lemma 2, there is no type 1 (respectively, type 2) blocking pair. This establishes the stability of matching M ′ . Next, consider a student s k ∈ (L − L ′ ) and suppose she is assigned to school h j . By the definition of L ′ , h j prefers Barrier(h j ) to s k , therefore, (Barrier(h j ), h j ) form a blocking pair, which is of type 2 if Barrier(h j ) = ∅ and type 1 otherwise. Hence the matching found in round R 2 is the largest stable extension of M. For any student s i ∈ L ′ , the Barriers are defined independent of her preference list and she is assigned to the best school in which she will not create a blocking pair. Hence, M 2 is DSIC for students.
For the problem of admitting fewer students, stated in Section 3.1, we give the following: Proposition 1. Let k be the total number of students added from L in round R 2 in the previous theorem and let k ′ < k. There is a polynomial time mechanism M 2 that is stability-preserving, DSIC for students and extends matching M to M ′ so that |M ′ | − |M| = k ′ .
Proof. Let c ′ denote the capacities of schools after round R 2 as per Theorem 1. Note that the total difference in capacities c ′ − c over all schools is k, where c is the capacity function in round R 1 . Starting with c ′ , arbitrarily decrease the capacities of schools to obtain capacity function c ′′ so that for any school h j , c ′ ( 
and h j appears before ∅ in l(s i )}. We claim that when this algorithm terminates, the matching found will be student-optimal, stable and each school h j will be allocated c ′′ (h j ) students from L. To see the last claim, observe that the proposals received by any school h j will be weakly better than the c ′ (h j ) − c(h j ) students of L who were allocated to h j under matching M ′ .
Setting II
The mechanism for round R 2 for Min N Max L in Situation II is given in Figure 2 . Suppose there is a school h j , student s k ∈ S M is assigned to it and there is a student s i ∈ N such that h j prefers s i to s k . Now, if s i is kept unmatched, (s i , h j ) will form a blocking pair of type 1 by Lemma 2.
Next suppose h j is under-filled and there is a student s i ∈ N such that h j and s i prefer each other to ∅. This time, if s i is kept unmatched, (s i , h j ) will form a blocking pair of type 2 by Lemma 2. Therefore, all students in N ′ , computed in Step 3, need to be matched. Our mechanism keeps all students in N − N ′ unmatched, thereby minimizing the number of students matched from N.
We next describe the various barriers that need to be defined. The first one, defined in Step 2, plays the same role as that in Figure 1 . As before, if h j is under-filled, Barrier1( 
and h j appears before ∅ in l(s i )}.
10. Return M ′ . then (Barrier1(h j ), h j ) will form a blocking pair. In step 5, Barrier(H j ) is defined to be the more stringent of these two barriers.
The final question is which school should s i ∈ N ′ be matched to? One possibility is to compute for each student s i the set
t. M(s k ) = h j and h j prefers s i to s k }, and match s i to her best school in T(s i ).
Assume that s i is matched to h j under this scheme. The problem now is that s i may prefer school h k (of course, h k / ∈ T(s i )) and moreover h k prefers s i to some student s l ∈ L ′ who has been assigned to h k . If so, (s i , h k ) will form a blocking pair. One remedy is to redefine the barrier so s l is not assigned to h k . However, this will make the barrier even more stringent and the resulting mechanism will, in general, match fewer students from L than our mechanism. The latter is as follows: simply match s i to the best school which prefers her to the Barrier of that school.
Proof. of Theorem 2:
The arguments given above already establish stability of matching M ′ com-puted. Next, let us argue that the mechanism is DSIC for students in N and L. The matching M is not affected by the preference lists of N. Therefore the choice of N ′ and hence (N − N ′ ) is independent of the preference lists of N. Barrier1 is influenced only by preference lists of S M and Barrier2 by those of (N − N ′ ). Hence Barrier is independent of the preference lists of N ′ and L ′ . Hence, the matching of students in these two sets is also done in a DSIC manner.
As argued above, each student in N ′ needs to be matched simply to preserve stability. Since our mechanism does not match any more students from N it achieves Min N . As argued above, not imposing the more stringent of the two barriers computed may result in a blocking pair. Therefore our mechanism imposes the minimum needed restrictions while matching students from L. Hence it achieves Min N Max L .
Next, we turn to a slightly different problem within Setting 2, namely find the largest subset of (N ∪ L) that can be matched in a stability-preserving and DSIC manner. We call this problem Max N∪L . As shown below, this mechanism also solves the problems Max N Max L and Max L Max N , namely maximizing the number of students matched from L after having maximized the number of students matched from N and vice versa. Proof. We will show that the mechanism presented in Figure 1 , with (N ∪ L) playing the role of L, suffices. Barriers for schools are computed as before in Step 2. Denote the subset of (N ∪ L) that is matched in round R 2 by (N ∪ L) ′ ; it consists of students s i ∈ (N ∪ L) such that some school h j prefers s i to Barrier(h j ) and s i prefers h j to ∅. If so, s i is assigned to the best such school.
The argument given in Theorem 1 suffices to show stability of the matching produced. Observe that Barrier, computed in Step 2, is independent of the preference lists of N and L and hence the mechanism is DSIC for N and L. As before, matching any student from the rest of (N ∪ L) will lead to a blocking pair, and hence the mechanism maximizes the number of students matched in round R 2 .
Finally, since this mechanism acts on N and L independently of each other, it also solves Max N Max L and Max L Max N .
Setting III
In the mechanisms given in Theorems 1, 2 and 4, no student can gain by falsifying her preference list. In Setting II, a different way for a student, who should legitimately be in the set S, to cheat is to arrive in N instead in round R 2 and thereby get assigned to a better school. This is illustrated in Example 1. 2. Remove all students of (S − S 1 ) from M.
3. While ∃ school h j which participates in a type 2 blocking pair: in round R 1 . If B is also in set S in round R 1 , she will be matched to school 2. On the other hand, if she is in set N in round R 2 , she will be matched to school 1, which she prefers.
In fact, no mechanism can be DSIC w.r.t. application time in setting II, as shown in Example 2. (1, 2, 3), (2, 1, 3), (2, 3, 1), (2, 3, 1) respectively. The preferences for 1, 2, 3 are (B, A, C, D), (A, C, B, D) , (C, B, A, D) To get around this impossibility result, we move to the more stringent, non-oblivious Setting III described in Section 3.3 and prove Theorem 3.
11. Return M ′ . The mechanisms M 1 and M 2 are given in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. M 1 first computes the student-optimal matching for all students in S. Then all students in (S − S 1 ) are removed from the matching. Clearly, there will be empty seats, and hence, type 2 blocking pairs may be formed. While there exists a blocking pair of type 2 including a school h j , student s i = BS-Preferring(h j ) is reassigned to h j . This cuts down an empty seat in h j , but creates another empty seat in the school that s i was previously matched to. As shown in Lemma 3, this process terminates in polynomial time.
Lemma 3.
Step 3 in mechanism M 1 , given in Figure 3 , runs in polynomial time.
Proof. When a reassignment happens, the school-assignment of the student improves, i.e., she prefers the new school to the previous match. Therefore, at most nm reassignments can take place.
Reassigning s i to h j cannot create type 1 blocking pairs, as proven later in Lemma 4, but can potentially fix type 2 blocking pairs containing h j . The mechanism returns the final matching when no blocking pairs remain.
Lemma 4.
The matching M returned by M 1 is stable.
Proof. Clearly, the matching is stable after Step 1. Moreover, Step 2 introduces only blocking pairs of type 2. Hence, at the beginning of Step 3, where the reassignments are made, only blocking pairs of type 2 exist. A reassignment for school h j matches h j to s i = BS-Preferring(h j ). Hence, after the reassignment, s i becomes LPS-Assigned(h j ), and the new BS-Preferring(h j ) if exists, must appear after s i in the preference list of h j . By Lemma 2, no blocking pairs of type 1 are created. When
Step 3 finishes, all blocking pairs of type 2 are also fixed. Since
Step 3 must finish in polynomial time according to Lemma 3, the matching M returned is stable.
The second mechanism M 2 is similar to the one given in Figure 2 . The main difference is that, instead of allocating student s i ∈ N ′ in the best school among her possible matches (FeasibleSchools(s i )), we accept her in the best among the schools that prefer her to their least preferred student, or are under-filled (Preferring-Schools(s i )). As a consequence, Barrier(h j ), for each j, also needs to be updated in a suitable way. By a similar argument to the one given in Section 4. If s i ∈ L t , i.e., s i is not matched in the first round even if she report her true preferences, then s i cannot be matched in the first round regardless of the prefereces she reports. This dues to the incentive-compatibility of the student-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm [DF81] . In R 2 , s i is assigned to the best possible school, according to her reported list, subject to the Barriers. Since the Barriers are independent of her preference list, she cannot gain by misreporting.
If s i ∈ S t M , the school which she is assigned to in M t will be her final school. Again, by the incentive-compatibility of Gale-Shapley, she cannot be matched to a better school.
Lemma 7.
If s i only comes in R 2 , she is assigned to the same school that she would be assigned to had she come in R 1 also, regardless of the preferences she reports.
Proof.
Since s i comes in R 2 , M c can be obtained from M 0 , the student-optimal matching (w.r.t. the preference list s i report), by the following procedure:
• If there is no student preferring h j than her current school, stop. Otherwise, let s i 1 be BS-Preferring(h j ) and
• If there is no student preferring h j 1 than her current school, stop. Otherwise, let s i 2 be BS-Preferring(h j 1 ) and
. . .
The procedure ends when there is no student preferring h j k for some k. We know that the procedure is finite according to Lemma 3. Construct a directed graph G whose vertices are in H ∪ {∅} and an edge for each reassignment: Proof. Consider building G in the order of the procedure. Notice that each reassignment sends a student to the school where the previously reassigned student left. Hence, each new edge that appears will point towards the tail of the previous edge. Let C be the first cycle that appears, for the sake of contradiction. Suppose
In particular, the reassignment of x 1 appears first and the reassignment of x t appears last among all assignments in the cycle. Consider G at the point where C appears. Since C is the first cycle appearing, each school in C has exactly one incoming edge. In other words, there are no students reassigned to any schools in C before the reassignment of x 1 . Therefore, 
Let M 1 be the matching obtained by reassigning s i from h j to h k and applying all reassignments in P. Then all students reassigned in the process are BS-Preferring of the schools they are reassigned to w.r.t. M 0 . By Lemma 2, no blocking pairs are created and M 1 is stable. Moreover, the reassigned students get better schools in M 1 . This contradicts the student-optimality of M 0 .
By Lemmas 6 and 7, a student in S cannot gain by misreporting her preferences, or arriving only in R 2 , or both. This completes the analysis for the first case.
Second case:
If s i is a not student in S, she comes in R 2 . Hence, she can only cheat by misreporting her preference list. Since Preferring-Schools(s i ) is independent of the list she reports, and she is matched to the best school in Preferring-Schools(s i ) w.r.t the list, she cannot gain by misreporting.
From the argument in the above two cases, we have:
Proof of Theorem 3. By Lemmas 4 and 5, both matchings returned by M 1 and M 2 are stable. Moreover, the pair (M 1 , M 2 ) is WIC according to Lemma 8. Notice that, all students in N ′ have to be matched to maintain stability. M 2 minimizes the set of matched students in N. Moreover, in order for WIC to hold, a student s i in N must be match to the best school in Preferring-Schools(s i ). By the assignments of students in N ′ , Barriers are created such that: if a student in L appears after the Barriers of all schools, assigning her will create a blocking pair. Hence, to preserve stability, those students cannot be matched. Since M 2 assigns all other students L ′ in L, M 2 maximizes the set of matched students in L, subject to N ′ .
Enumeration of Stable Extensions
In this section we show how to enumerate all the possible stable extensions of a given stable matching with polynomial delay between any two enumerated matchings. Specifically, the al- 
For i 1 in A 1 :
Enumerate M k . gorithm takes as input a stable matching M from S to H satisfying capacity c and a set of new students N = {s 1 , s 2 . . . s k } that can be added to the schools. Here the preference lists of all schools and students are also given. The algoirthm enumerates all solutions M ′ from S ∪ N to H ∪ {∅} such that:
• all assignments in M are preserved in M ′ , and
• M ′ is stable with respect to capacity c ′ where
Note that M ′−1 (h j ) is the set of students assigned to h j under M ′ . We say that M ′ is a stable extension of M with respect to N.
The complete algorithm StableExtension(M, c, N) is given in Figure 5 . At a high level, the algorithm maintains a stable extension M e of M with respect to a subset N ′ of N. At each step, a student s i is added to N ′ and all possible assignments A of s i that are compatible to M e are identified. In other words, adding each assignment in A to M e gives a stable extension of M with respect to N ′ ∪ {s i }. The algorithm branches to an assignment in A and continues to the next student. When N ′ = N, the current matching is returned. The algorithm then backtracks to a previous branching point and continues. Figure 6 gives the subroutine for finding compatible assignments. It takes on input the current matching M e , capacity c, student s i and finds all possible assignments A i of s i to H ∪ {∅} such that stability is preserved. Initially, A i is set to be an empty set. The subroutine then goes through the preference list of s i one by one in decreasing order. The considered school h is added to A i and the subroutine terminates if at least one of the following happens:
• h is ∅,
• h is under-filled,
• h prefers s i to LPS-Assigned(h) with respect to M e .
Notice that in the last two scenarios above, if s i was assigned to any school after h in her preference list, (s i , h) would form a blocking pair. Assume none of the above scenarios happens. The subroutine adds h to A and continues if h prefers s i to BS-Preferring(h). Otherwise, h prefers BS-Preferring(h) to s i . Hence, assigning s i to h would create a blocking pair. The subroutine continues to the next school in this case. The following lemma says that FeasibleAssignment correctly finds all possible assignments of a student, given the current matching, at each step.
Discussion
Designing a mechanism that actually gets used in practice involves consideration of numerous low-level details, which is not the focus of this paper. Indeed, this paper should be viewed as a work in algorithm design, motivated by natural questions from school choice, and adhering fairly closely to the ground rules of that discipline. At the same time, it is important to note that algorithmic insights obtained from work done in a mathematically clean, abstract setting can be immensely powerful and once put in the hands of practitioners, can lead to implementations that beat the ones obtained by simply working on the low-level details of the problem domain. Indeed, this has been observed time and again 1 . This precisely is the power of the "algorithmic way of thinking," a key paradigm developed within Theoretical Computer Science.
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